| From | Jann Horn <> | Date | Thu, 29 Oct 2020 02:06:06 +0100 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v22 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions |
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On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead > to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker > to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing > malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of > the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. > > A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process > and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating > processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a > target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target > process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). > > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
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