| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 5.8 285/633] bpf: disallow attaching modify_return tracing functions to other BPF programs | Date | Tue, 27 Oct 2020 14:50:28 +0100 |
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From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 1af9270e908cd50a4f5d815c9b6f794c7d57ed07 ]
>From the checks and commit messages for modify_return, it seems it was never the intention that it should be possible to attach a tracing program with expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN to another BPF program. However, check_attach_modify_return() will only look at the function name, so if the target function starts with "security_", the attach will be allowed even for bpf2bpf attachment.
Fix this oversight by also blocking the modification if a target program is supplied.
Fixes: 18644cec714a ("bpf: Fix use-after-free in fmod_ret check") Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN") Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 89b07db146763..c953dfbbaa6a9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -10862,6 +10862,11 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { + if (tgt_prog) { + verbose(env, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } ret = check_attach_modify_return(prog, addr); if (ret) verbose(env, "%s() is not modifiable\n", -- 2.25.1
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