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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] ima: add the ability to query the hash of a given file.
On 06-Jan 17:25, Florent Revest wrote:
> From: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
>
> This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
> system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
> of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.
>
> It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
> audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
> but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
> subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
> for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.
>
> This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
> https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/
>
> [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393
>
> Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>

Thanks for adding this Florent!

Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>

> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 6d904754d858..d621c65ba9a5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
> +extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
> extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> @@ -91,6 +92,11 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
> return;
> }
>
> +static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
> static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index d7e987baf127..3799b6c6c3b8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -445,6 +445,52 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
>
> +/**
> + * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed.
> + * @file: pointer to the file
> + * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
> + * @buf_size: length of the buffer
> + *
> + * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
> + * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
> + * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
> + * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
> + * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
> + *
> + * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
> + * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
> + */
> +int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode;
> + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> + int hash_algo;
> +
> + if (!file)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!ima_policy_flag)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + inode = file_inode(file);
> + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
> + if (!iint)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
> + if (buf) {
> + size_t copied_size;
> +
> + copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
> + memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
> + }
> + hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
> + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
> +
> + return hash_algo;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
> +
> /**
> * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
> * @file : newly created tmpfile
> --
> 2.24.1.735.g03f4e72817-goog
>

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