Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 14 Jun 2019 17:07:05 -0700 | From | Alison Schofield <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs |
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On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 01:55:20PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:44:07PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> > > > > Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS. > > Test the VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to make sure they all > > meet that requirement before encrypting any. > > > > The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt > > any VMA's if this check fails. > > > > Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > This should be folded back into the initial implemention, methinks.
It is part of the initial implementation. I looked for places to split the implementation into smaller, reviewable patches, hence this split. None of it gets built until the CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME is introduced in a later patch.
The encrypt_mprotect() patchset is ordered like this: 1) generalize mprotect to support the mktme extension 2) wire up encrypt_mprotect() 3) implement encrypt_mprotect() 4) keep reference counts on encryption keys (was VMAs) 5) (this patch) restrict to anonymous VMAs.
I thought Patch 5) was a small, but meaningful split. It accentuates the fact that MKTME is restricted to anonymous memory.
Alas, I want to make it logical to review, so I'll move it.
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