Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support) | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Fri, 24 May 2019 10:51:02 -0700 |
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> On May 24, 2019, at 10:07 AM, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote: > >> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:43:27AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 12:24 AM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@intel.com> wrote: >>> /** >>> * Summary: >>> * - The enclave file resembles a shared object that contains RO/RX/RW segments >>> * - FILE__* are assigned to /dev/sgx/enclave, to determine acceptable permissions to mmap()/mprotect(), valid combinations are >>> * + FILE__READ - Allow SGX1 enclaves only >>> * + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expand data segments (e.g. heaps, stacks, etc.) >> >> I think this is a non-starter :( FILE__WRITE also means that you can >> write to the file, and the admin / policy author will almost never >> want to allow that. > > Why would FILE__WRITE on /dev/sgx/enclave be a problem? An actual > write to /dev/sgx/enclave would yield -EINVAL, no?
Bah, read it wrong — FILE__WRITE on the enclave file on disk is no good.
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