Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:56:19 +0200 | From | Jarkko Sakkinen <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate |
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On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 07:01:39PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > Commit 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from > tpm_default_chip()") changed the tpm_chip argument of every TPM function > from NULL to a pointer that is retrieved at module initialization time. > > Unlike before this patch, the trusted module cannot be loaded if no TPM is > available. Unfortunately, this causes a dependency problem because the > encrypted key type requires the 'key_type_trusted' symbol when > CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS is defined. > > This patch fixes the issue by deferring the execution of TPM-specific code > until a new trusted key is instantiated: init_tpm(), to obtain a tpm_chip > pointer; init_digests(), introduced by commit 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an > array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"), to get random > bytes from the TPM to lock a PCR. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()") > Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Definitive NAK for the release. Sorting out the dependency problem is definitely out of scope for v5.1.
/Jarkko
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