Messages in this thread | | | From | Dan Williams <> | Date | Mon, 18 Mar 2019 17:30:22 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM |
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On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 5:24 PM James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail > > trusted-key operations. > > What actual problem is this fixing? To me it would seem like an > enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no > TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work. > Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful > insertion of trusted.ko?
The module dependency chain relies on it. If that can be broken that would also be an acceptable fix.
I found this through the following dependency chain: libnvdimm.ko -> encrypted_keys.ko -> trusted.ko.
"key_type_trusted" is the symbol that encrypted_keys needs regardless of whether the tpm is present.
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