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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
From
Date
Hi,

On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise
> assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3
> and isn't in our whitelist.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> index f6d84e2c92fe..d31bd770acba 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
> +static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
> static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
>
> static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> @@ -963,6 +963,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> { /* sentinel */ }
> };
> char const *str = "command line option";
> + bool meltdown_safe;
> +
> + meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
> +
> + /* Defer to CPU feature registers */
> + if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
> + meltdown_safe = true;
> +
> + if (!meltdown_safe)
> + __meltdown_safe = false;
>
> /*
> * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
> @@ -974,6 +984,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> __kpti_forced = -1;
> }
>
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
> + pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by CONFIG\n");
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> /* Forced? */
> if (__kpti_forced) {
> pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
> @@ -985,14 +1000,10 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
> return kaslr_offset() > 0;
>
> - /* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
> - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
> - return false;
> -
> - /* Defer to CPU feature registers */
> - return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
> + return !meltdown_safe;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
> static void
> kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> {
> @@ -1022,6 +1033,13 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>
> return;
> }
> +#else
> +static void
> +kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
> +
>
> static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
> {
> @@ -1035,7 +1053,6 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
> return 0;
> }
> early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
> -#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
> static inline void __cpu_enable_hw_dbm(void)
> @@ -1286,7 +1303,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT,
> .min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_32BIT_64BIT,
> },
> -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
> {
> .desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
> .capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
> @@ -1302,7 +1318,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> .matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
> .cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
> },
> -#endif
> {
> /* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
> .capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
> @@ -2063,3 +2078,15 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
> }
>
> core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
> +
> +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> + char *buf)
> +{
> + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
> + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
> +
> + if (__meltdown_safe)
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");

Shall those two checks be swapped? So it doesn't report about a KPTI
mitigation if the CPU is safe, but we enable KPTI because of KASLR
having enabled it? Or is that a different knob?

Cheers,
Andre.

> +
> + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +}
>

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