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SubjectRe: BUG: assuming atomic context at kernel/seccomp.c:LINE
From
Date
On 02/20/2019 10:32 AM, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit:    abf446c90405 Add linux-next specific files for 20190220
> git tree:       linux-next
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17f250d8c00000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=463cb576ac40e350
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8bf19ee2aa580de7a2a7
> compiler:       gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
>
> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+8bf19ee2aa580de7a2a7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> BUG: assuming atomic context at kernel/seccomp.c:271
> in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 12803, name: syz-executor.5
> no locks held by syz-executor.5/12803.
> CPU: 1 PID: 12803 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7-next-20190220 #39
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
>  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
>  dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
>  __cant_sleep kernel/sched/core.c:6218 [inline]
>  __cant_sleep.cold+0xa3/0xbb kernel/sched/core.c:6195
>  seccomp_run_filters kernel/seccomp.c:271 [inline]
>  __seccomp_filter+0x12b/0x12b0 kernel/seccomp.c:801
>  __secure_computing+0x101/0x360 kernel/seccomp.c:932
>  syscall_trace_enter+0x5bf/0xe10 arch/x86/entry/common.c:120
>  do_syscall_64+0x479/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:280
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

False positive; bpf-next only. Pushing this out in a bit:

From d56547070162a105ff666f3324e558fa6492aedd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 10:51:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, seccomp: fix false positive preemption splat for
cbpf->ebpf progs

In 568f196756ad ("bpf: check that BPF programs run with preemption disabled")
a check was added for BPF_PROG_RUN() that for every invocation preemption is
disabled to not break eBPF assumptions (e.g. per-cpu map). Of course this does
not count for seccomp because only cBPF -> eBPF is loaded here and it does not
make use of any functionality that would require this assertion. Fix this false
positive by adding and using __BPF_PROG_RUN() variant that does not have the
cant_sleep(); check.

Fixes: 568f196756ad ("bpf: check that BPF programs run with preemption disabled")
Reported-by: syzbot+8bf19ee2aa580de7a2a7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
include/linux/filter.h | 9 ++++++++-
kernel/seccomp.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index f32b3ec..2f3e29a 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -533,7 +533,14 @@ struct sk_filter {
struct bpf_prog *prog;
};

-#define BPF_PROG_RUN(filter, ctx) ({ cant_sleep(); (*(filter)->bpf_func)(ctx, (filter)->insnsi); })
+#define bpf_prog_run__non_preempt(prog, ctx) \
+ ({ cant_sleep(); __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx); })
+/* Native eBPF or cBPF -> eBPF transitions. Preemption must be disabled. */
+#define BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx) \
+ bpf_prog_run__non_preempt(prog, ctx)
+/* cBPF -> eBPF only, but not for native eBPF. */
+#define __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx) \
+ (*(prog)->bpf_func)(ctx, (prog)->insnsi)

#define BPF_SKB_CB_LEN QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index e815781..826d4e4 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
for (; f; f = f->prev) {
- u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd);
+ u32 cur_ret = __BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd);

if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
ret = cur_ret;
--
2.9.5
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