Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5.4 regression fix] x86/boot: Provide memzero_explicit | From | Hans de Goede <> | Date | Mon, 7 Oct 2019 15:00:51 +0200 |
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Hi Stephan,
On 07-10-2019 11:34, Stephan Mueller wrote: > Am Montag, 7. Oktober 2019, 11:06:04 CEST schrieb Hans de Goede: > > Hi Hans, > >> Hi Stephan, >> >> On 07-10-2019 10:59, Stephan Mueller wrote: >>> Am Montag, 7. Oktober 2019, 10:55:01 CEST schrieb Hans de Goede: >>> >>> Hi Hans, >>> >>>> The purgatory code now uses the shared lib/crypto/sha256.c sha256 >>>> implementation. This needs memzero_explicit, implement this. >>>> >>>> Reported-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> >>>> Fixes: 906a4bb97f5d ("crypto: sha256 - Use get/put_unaligned_be32 to get >>>> input, memzero_explicit") Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede >>>> <hdegoede@redhat.com> >>>> --- >>>> >>>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c | 5 +++++ >>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c >>>> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c index 81fc1eaa3229..511332e279fe >>>> 100644 >>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c >>>> @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n) >>>> >>>> return s; >>>> >>>> } >>>> >>>> +void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count) >>>> +{ >>>> + memset(s, 0, count); >>> >>> May I ask how it is guaranteed that this memset is not optimized out by >>> the >>> compiler, e.g. for stack variables? >> >> The function and the caller live in different compile units, so unless >> LTO is used this cannot happen. > > Agreed in this case. > > I would just be worried that this memzero_explicit implementation is assumed > to be protected against optimization when used elsewhere since other > implementations of memzero_explicit are provided with the goal to be protected > against optimizations. >> >> Also note that the previous purgatory private (vs shared) sha256 >> implementation had: >> >> /* Zeroize sensitive information. */ >> memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx)); >> >> In the place where the new shared 256 code uses memzero_explicit() and the >> new shared sha256 code is the only user of the >> arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c memzero_explicit() implementation. >> >> With that all said I'm open to suggestions for improving this. > > What speaks against the common memzero_explicit implementation?
Nothing, but the purgatory is a standalone binary which runs between 2 kernels when doing kexec so it cannot use the function from lib/string.c since it is not linked against the lib/string.o object.
> If you cannot > use it, what about adding a barrier in the memzero_explicit implementation? Or > what about adding some compiler magic as attached to this email?
Since the purgatory code is running in a somewhat limited environment, with not all standard headers / macros available I was afraid that the barrier_data() from the lib/string.c implementation would not work, so I left it out. In hindsight I should have really given it a try first as it seems to compile fine and there are no missing symbols in arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.ro when using it.
So I will send out a new version with the barrier_data() added making the arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c implementation identical to the lib/string.c one.
Regards,
Hans
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