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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in text_poke() where possible
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 04:59:55PM -0800, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
> On January 10, 2019 9:42:57 AM PST, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> >On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:32:43PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> >> On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
> >> Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> > > While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this
> >instruction,
> >> > > smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security
> >exploit.
> >> >
> >> > Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern.
> >BTW,
> >> > text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.
> >>
> >> But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a
> >bit
> >> of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
> >> pretty robust.
> >
> >Did we (they?) list any caveats for this behavior? E.g. I'm fairly
> >certain atomicity guarantees go out the window if WC memtype is used.
>
> If you run code from non-WB memory, all bets are off and you better
> not be doing cross-modifying code.

I wasn't thinking of running code from non-WB, but rather running code
in WB while doing a CMC write via WC.

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