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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks
    On Tue, Sep 04, 2018 at 07:35:29PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
    > On Tue, 4 Sep 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
    >
    > > > Current ptrace_may_access() implementation assumes that the 'source' task is
    > > > always the caller (current).
    > > >
    > > > Expose ___ptrace_may_access() that can be used to apply the check on arbitrary
    > > > tasks.
    > >
    > > Casey recently has proposed putting the decision making of whether to
    > > do IBPB in the security module.
    > >
    > > https://lwn.net/ml/kernel-hardening/20180815235355.14908-4-casey.schaufler@intel.com/
    > >
    > > That will have the advantage of giving the administrator a more flexibility
    > > of when to turn on IBPB. The policy is very similar to what you have proposed here
    > > but I think the security module is a more appropriate place for the security policy.
    >
    > Yeah, well, honestly, I have a bit hard time buying the "generic
    > sidechannel prevention security module" idea, given how completely
    > different in nature all the mitigations have been so far. I don't see that
    > trying to abstract this somehow provides more clarity.
    >
    > So if this should be done in LSM, it'd probably have to be written by
    > someone else than me :) who actually understands how the "sidechannel LSM"
    > idea works.

    Yeah, I'm not convinced on LSM either. Lets just do these here patches
    first and then Casey can try and convince us later.

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