[lkml]   [2018]   [Sep]   [22]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
Subject[PATCH 3.16 39/63] x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit
3.16.58-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Andy Lutomirski <>

commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.

error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of
the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in
regs->cs. Just use regs->cs.

This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.

It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, the
xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:

jmp error_exit

And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX
contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.

Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now,
depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by:

commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")

With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
problem goes away.

I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.

[ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
of the bug it fixed. ]

[ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
kernels. If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to
add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should
also fix the problem. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <>
Cc: Brian Gerst <>
Cc: Dave Hansen <>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <>
Cc: Greg KH <>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <>
Cc: Juergen Gross <>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <>
Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- error_exit moved EBX to EAX before testing it, so delete both instructions
- error_exit does RESTORE_REST earlier, so adjust the offset to saved CS
- Drop inapplicable comment changes
- Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <>
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
.if \paranoid
jmp paranoid_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
- jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
+ jmp error_exit

@@ -1411,7 +1411,6 @@ END(paranoid_exit)

* Exception entry point. This expects an error code/orig_rax on the stack.
- * returns in "no swapgs flag" in %ebx.
@@ -1440,7 +1439,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* the kernel CR3 here.
- xorl %ebx,%ebx
testl $3,CS+8(%rsp)
je error_kernelspace
@@ -1456,7 +1454,6 @@ error_sti:
* for these here too.
- incl %ebx
leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip),%rcx
cmpq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
je error_bad_iret
@@ -1477,22 +1474,18 @@ error_bad_iret:
mov %rsp,%rdi
call fixup_bad_iret
mov %rax,%rsp
- decl %ebx /* Return to usergs */
jmp error_sti

-/* ebx: no swapgs flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) */
- movl %ebx,%eax
- testl %eax,%eax
- jne retint_kernel
+ testb $3, CS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
+ jz retint_kernel
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-09-22 02:22    [W:0.140 / U:0.524 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site