Messages in this thread |  | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock | From | Casey Schaufler <> | Date | Sat, 22 Sep 2018 09:38:12 -0700 |
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On 9/21/2018 8:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >> v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other >> cleanups suggested by Kees Cook. >> Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux >> credential blob poisoning. > Thanks for the splitting, this really does make it easier to review > (at least for me). I think this looks really good, though obviously > I'd like to refactor it slightly on top of my series. :)
Whichever goes on top is fine with me. What's one more patch set merge, after all?
> One additional thought I had was about the blobs allocations: some are > separate kmem caches, and some are kmalloc. I'm thinking it might make > sense to use separate kmem caches for two reasons:
I had seriously considered doing that. I can't see any reason not to. It's something that could be done at any time, and with all the other things that had to change it just didn't get in.
> - they're going to always be the same size and are regularly > allocated/freed, so it may offer a performance benefit. > > - they're explicitly not supposed to be exposed to userspace, so > hardened usercopy would protect them if they were not kmalloc()ed. > > I'm excited about getting this landed!
Soon. Real soon. I hope. I would very much like for someone from the SELinux camp to chime in, especially on the selinux_is_enabled() removal.
On a somewhat related note, I will be out for the first three weeks of October, returning just in time for the Linux Security Summit in Edinburgh. My connectivity will be severely limited. I don't expect to accomplish anything while I'm out.
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