Messages in this thread |  | | From | Kees Cook <> | Date | Fri, 21 Sep 2018 20:02:57 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock |
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On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other > cleanups suggested by Kees Cook. > Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux > credential blob poisoning.
Thanks for the splitting, this really does make it easier to review (at least for me). I think this looks really good, though obviously I'd like to refactor it slightly on top of my series. :)
One additional thought I had was about the blobs allocations: some are separate kmem caches, and some are kmalloc. I'm thinking it might make sense to use separate kmem caches for two reasons:
- they're going to always be the same size and are regularly allocated/freed, so it may offer a performance benefit.
- they're explicitly not supposed to be exposed to userspace, so hardened usercopy would protect them if they were not kmalloc()ed.
I'm excited about getting this landed!
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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