Messages in this thread | | | From | Kees Cook <> | Date | Mon, 10 Sep 2018 09:45:28 -0700 | Subject | Re: get_arg_page() && ptr_size accounting |
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On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote: >> Hi Kees, >> >> I was thinking about backporting the commit 98da7d08850fb8bde >> ("fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers"), but I am not sure >> I understand it...
BTW, if you backport that, please get the rest associated with the various Stack Clash related weaknesses:
c31dbb146dd4 exec: pin stack limit during exec b83838313386 exec: introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread() 8f2af155b513 exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions 7bd698b3c04e exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check e816c201aed5 exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec 779f4e1c6c7c Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" 04e35f4495dd exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit() fe8993b3a05c exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing 64701dee4178 exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec 473d89639db0 exec: Consolidate dumpability logic a70423dfbc58 exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal e37fdb785a5f exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability 2af622802696 LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook 46d98eb4e1d2 commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook c425e189ffd7 binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag a9208e42ba99 exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" ddb4a1442def exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds da029c11e6b1 exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM 98da7d08850f fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
(and there may be more related to the secureexec changes)
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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