Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Thu, 30 Aug 2018 10:34:37 -0700 |
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> On Aug 30, 2018, at 10:19 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> wrote: > >> On 08/30/2018 09:23 AM, Jann Horn wrote: >> Three threads (A, B, C) run with the same CR3. >> >> 1. a dirty+writable PTE is placed directly in front of B's shadow stack. >> (this can happen, right? or is there a guard page?) >> 2. C's TLB caches the dirty+writable PTE. >> 3. A performs some syscall that triggers ptep_set_wrprotect(). >> 4. A's syscall calls clear_bit(). >> 5. B's TLB caches the transient shadow stack. >> [now C has write access to B's transiently-extended shadow stack] >> 6. B recurses into the transiently-extended shadow stack >> 7. C overwrites the transiently-extended shadow stack area. >> 8. B returns through the transiently-extended shadow stack, giving >> the attacker instruction pointer control in B. >> 9. A's syscall broadcasts a TLB flush. > > Heh, that's a good point. The shadow stack permissions are *not* > strictly reduced because a page getting marked as shadow-stack has > *increased* permissions when being used as a shadow stack. Fun. > > For general hardening, it seems like we want to ensure that there's a > guard page at the bottom of the shadow stack. Yu-cheng, do we have a > guard page? > > But, to keep B's TLB from picking up the entry, I think we can just make > it !Present for a moment. No TLB can cache it, and I believe the same > "don't set Dirty on a !Writable entry" logic also holds for !Present > (modulo a weird erratum or two).
Can we get documentation? Pretty please?
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