Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH RFC v2 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Mon, 20 Aug 2018 12:02:53 -0400 |
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On 08/17/2018 06:16 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they > have PROCESS_SHARE access.
Now the description and the code no longer match.
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++ > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, > spin_unlock(&isec->lock); > } > > +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) > +{ > + struct av_decision avd; > + > + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), > + SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, 0, &avd); > +}
And my question from before still stands: why do we need a new hook and new security module instead of just using ptrace_may_access()?
> + > /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ > static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, > struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) > @@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), >
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