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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/3] crypto: ccp - return an actual key size from RSA max_size callback
On 3/2/2018 5:15 PM, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
> On 02.03.2018 17:44, Herbert Xu wrote:
>> On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 05:03:21PM +0100, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
>>> rsa-pkcs1pad uses a value returned from a RSA implementation max_size
>>> callback as a size of an input buffer passed to the RSA implementation for
>>> encrypt and sign operations.
>>> CCP RSA implementation uses a hardware input buffer which size depends only
>>> on the current RSA key length, so it should return this key length in
>>> the max_size callback, too.
>>> This also matches what the kernel software RSA implementation does.
>>> Previously, the value returned from this callback was always the maximum
>>> RSA key size the CCP hardware supports.
>>> This resulted in this huge buffer being passed by rsa-pkcs1pad to CCP even
>>> for smaller key sizes and then in a buffer overflow when ccp_run_rsa_cmd()
>>> tried to copy this large input buffer into a RSA key length-sized hardware
>>> input buffer.
>>> Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <>
>>> Fixes: ceeec0afd684 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for RSA on the CCP")
>>> Cc:
>> Patch applied. Thanks.
> Thanks.
> However, what about the first patch from this series?
> Without it, while it no longer should cause a buffer overflow, in-kernel
> X.509 certificate verification will still fail with CCP driver loaded
> (since CCP RSA implementation has a higher priority than the software
> RSA implementation).
> Maciej

I commented on that one here:

Effectively a NACK. We are a reviewing a proposed patch right now.

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