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    Subject[PATCH 3.2 089/104] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
    3.2.101-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

    ------------------

    From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

    commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream.

    Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
    in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
    kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
    mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

    Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
    Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
    Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
    Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
    Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
    Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
    Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
    ---
    arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

    --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
    +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
    @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct sysde
    {
    if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
    return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
    - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
    + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
    }

    ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct sysdev_class *dev,
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