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Subject[PATCH 13/45] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
Date
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit c2f0ad4fc089 upstream.

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 3531fec..00025c5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;

/*
+ * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+ * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+ */
+ dsb(nsh);
+ isb();
+
+ /*
* Enable/disable UAO so that copy_to_user() etc can access
* kernel memory with the unprivileged instructions.
*/
--
2.7.4
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