Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Wed, 28 Feb 2018 00:09:13 +0000 | Subject | Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions |
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On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > > On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: >>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> I think you're wrong here. Any sane container trying to use Landlock >>> like this would also create a PID namespace. Problem solved. I still >>> think you should drop this patch. > > Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web > browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail, > Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a > developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications > (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls > (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to > create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful > access-control. >
The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp. If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web browser, I can debug the browser.
If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp feature.
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