Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA | From | Mimi Zohar <> | Date | Sun, 09 Dec 2018 13:39:56 -0500 |
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Hi Nayna,
On Sun, 2018-12-09 at 01:56 +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. > In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is possible that the new kernel image is signed with third party keys > which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The > kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform/firmware keys. > > The secure boot key database is expected to store the keys as EFI > Signature List(ESL). The patch set uses David Howells and Josh Boyer's > patch to access and parse the ESL to extract the certificates and load > them onto the platform keyring. > > The last patch in this patch set adds support for IMA-appraisal to > verify the kexec'ed kernel image based on keys stored in the platform > keyring.
Thanks! This patch set is now in the #next-integrity branch.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git/
Mimi
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