Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Mark Salyzyn <> | Subject | /proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users | Date | Fri, 2 Nov 2018 12:08:59 -0700 |
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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 51d7b120418e99d6b3bf8df9eb3cc31e8171dee4 upstream ported to 3.18.y
In commit c4004b02f8e5b ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some system programs actually use it.
This limits all the detailed resource information to properly credentialed users instead.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.18 --- kernel/resource.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index d9c7d5d77c8a..83658ca0e69c 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -104,16 +104,25 @@ static int r_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct resource *root = m->private; struct resource *r = v, *p; + unsigned long long start, end; int width = root->end < 0x10000 ? 4 : 8; int depth; for (depth = 0, p = r; depth < MAX_IORES_LEVEL; depth++, p = p->parent) if (p->parent == root) break; + + if (file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + start = r->start; + end = r->end; + } else { + start = end = 0; + } + seq_printf(m, "%*s%0*llx-%0*llx : %s\n", depth * 2, "", - width, (unsigned long long) r->start, - width, (unsigned long long) r->end, + width, start, + width, end, r->name ? r->name : "<BAD>"); return 0; } -- 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog
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