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Subject[patch V2 14/28] x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const

Fix up all the string arrays.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
};

-static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
};

-static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
+static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
-static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = "auto",
[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = "vulnerable",
[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = "conditional cache flushes",

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