Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 22 Oct 2018 01:32:04 +0200 (CEST) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak |
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On Sun, 21 Oct 2018, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Imagine JIT running evil code (flash, javascript). JIT will prevent evil > code from doing ptrace() (or maybe there is syscall filter in effect or > something like that), but if evil code can poison branch buffers and do > timings, security problem stays.
JITs sort of remove the traditional unix security domain boundary between mutually (un)trusted code (processess and threads), that's a more general problem, yes.
> Do we need prctl(I_DONT_RUN_EVIL_CODE)?
That's basically the level of fine-graining Tim's followup patchset (that's currently being discussed) is eventually going to achieve.
Thanks,
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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