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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> wrote:
    > On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
    >
    >> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
    >> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> wrote:
    >> > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
    >> > >
    >> > > [ ... snip ... ]
    >> > >> Andi Kleen (1):
    >> > >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
    >> > >>
    >> > >> Dan Williams (13):
    >> > >> x86: implement nospec_barrier()
    >> > >> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >> userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
    >> > >>
    >> > >> Mark Rutland (4):
    >> > >> asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers
    >> > >> Documentation: document nospec helpers
    >> > >> arm64: implement nospec_ptr()
    >> > >> arm: implement nospec_ptr()
    >> > >
    >> > > So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden
    >> > > don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and
    >> > > LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT?
    >> > >
    >> > > Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way?
    >> > >
    >> > > Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem
    >> > > like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right?
    >> >
    >> > Here is the latest (v3) bpf fix:
    >> >
    >> > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856645/
    >> >
    >> > I currently have v2 on my 'nospec' branch and will move that to v3 for
    >> > the next update, unless it goes upstream before then.
    >
    > Daniel, I guess you're planning to send this still for 4.15?

    It's pending in the bpf.git tree:

    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git/commit/?id=b2157399cc9

    >> That patch seems specific to CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. Is the bpf() syscall
    >> the only attack vector? Or are there other ways to run bpf programs
    >> that we should be worried about?
    >
    > Seems like Alexei is probably the only person in the whole universe who
    > isn't CCed here ... let's fix that.

    He will be cc'd on v2 of this series which will be available later today.

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