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    SubjectRe: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs
    Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> writes:

    > The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists)
    > write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a
    > process that will become the first process in a new container.
    > This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a
    > container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to
    > verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own
    > container ID.

    Why a u64?

    Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message?
    I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to
    be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts?

    Why the ability to change the containerid? What is the use case you are
    thinking of there?

    Eric

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