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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] Revert "pstore: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps"
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Sergey Senozhatsky
<sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> wrote:
> can we accidentally "leak" kernel pointers or some other critical
> info? kptr_restrict requires CAP_SYSLOG and pstore read used to
> require CAP_SYSLOG, but it seems that now we can bypass it by
> letting "entirely unprivileged groups" to read pstore. is there
> something to be concerned about (or at least mention it in the
> commit messages)?

I can expand the commit message a bit more, sure. There may be
sensitive things in pstorefs, and it's up to a system builder to
decide how they want to deal with that risk. Most users of pstore
don't mount with update_ms=N so pstorefs contains (mostly) old
addresses. Without this change, though, a builder can't give
permissions to an unprivileged crash dump process without also giving
it CAP_SYSLOG which has much MORE privilege that it would need
(reading and wiping _current_ dmesg, for example).

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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