Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 7 Jun 2017 20:41:34 -0400 | From | Theodore Ts'o <> | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using |
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On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is > dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not > from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site > isn't relevant in assessing this.
The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is dependent on that commit landing, correct? (Order matters, because otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect and causing their kernel to deadlock during the boot while they are trying to track down an unreleated problem.)
- Ted
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