Messages in this thread | | | From | nicolas@belouin ... | Date | Sat, 21 Oct 2017 21:09:32 +0200 | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED |
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<james.l.morris@oracle.com>,linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net,ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com,linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org,linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,linux-api@vger.kernel.org,kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@belouin.fr> Message-ID: <99179B10-4EAE-4FAB-9D14-B885156261B3@belouin.fr>
On October 21, 2017 6:03:02 PM GMT+02:00, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> wrote: >Quoting Nicolas Belouin (nicolas@belouin.fr): >> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to >> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted >> xattr is near zero. >> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as >> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It >> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. > >You say "for example". Are you intending to add more uses? If so, >what >are they? If not, how about renaming it CAP_TRUSTED_XATTR? >
I don't see any other use for now, but I don't want it to be too narrow and non usable in a similar context in the future. So I believe the underlying purpose of marking a process as "trusted" (even if for now it only means rw permission on trusted xattr) is more meaningful.
>What all does allowing writes to trusted xattrs give you? There are >the overlayfs whiteouts, what else?
Nicolas
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