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Subject[tip:x86/mm] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow
Commit-ID:  063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f
Author: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:51:19 +0300
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 13:33:14 +0100

x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 303e470..1b1110f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -125,10 +125,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)

/*
* kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
- * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
- * no one should write to it.
+ * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+ * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
*/
memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+ for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+ pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+ }
+ /* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+ __flush_tlb_all();

init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
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