Messages in this thread | | | From | Paul Moore <> | Subject | Re: [RFC 4/8] lsm: smack: smack callbacks for kdbus security hooks | Date | Wed, 08 Jul 2015 16:07:11 -0400 |
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On Wednesday, July 08, 2015 09:38:25 AM Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 7/8/2015 6:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On 07/08/2015 06:25 AM, Paul Osmialowski wrote:
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> > If Smack only truly needs 3 hooks, then it begs the question of why > > there are so many other hooks defined. Are the other hooks just to > > support finer-grained distinctions, or is Smack's coverage incomplete? > > I haven't been following kdbus closely for a while, but the original > intent for Smack and kdbus was that it Smack controls would be on the > objects involved, and that to accomplish that only a small number of > hooks would be necessary. After all, Smack uses fewer hooks than SELinux > on other things. I do agree that without a user there is no point in > having hooks. If SELinux requires the other hooks we might want to > hold off on asking for the hooks until the SELinux implementation is > exposed. I also think that AppArmor should be examined as a potential > user of the hooks, just to make sure the hooks aren't excessively > oriented toward subject/object based security modules.
In Paul O.'s defense, we did have some discussion about the reasons for these hooks, although that seems like ages ago and I would need to dig through the archives (my inbox?) to find the reasoning for each.
However, I don't remember being very comfortable with the hooks back them largely due to uncertainty about how we were treating kdbus with respect to subjects/objects. I think it's worth restarting that discussion now before we nit pick the patches themselves.
-- paul moore security @ redhat
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