Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 24 May 2015 13:52:55 +0300 | From | Petko Manolov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/8] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #4] |
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On 15-05-22 08:28:17, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2015-05-22 at 08:48 +0100, David Howells wrote: > > Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> wrote: > > > > > > This is similar to what i am doing right now - create CA hierarchy so we can > > > > have something like: > > > > > > > > +-> KeyB > > > > | > > > > RootCA ---> CertA ---> CertB ---> CertC ---> KeyC > > > > | > > > > +-> CertA' ---> KeyA" > > > > > > How exactly do you go about uploading CertB to the kernel BTW? > > > > Assuming RootCA or CertA is present in the kernel, the idea would be to use > > the add_key() system call or the request_key() mechanism to add the key to > > the system keyring. The key in the cert would only be added to the keyring > > if it is trusted by a key already there. > > From Petko's description, the RootCA is on the system keyring, but CertA is on > a new IMA trusted CA keyring. So everything you said is true, but on this > new, yet to be upstreamed, IMA trusted CA keyring.
I only named this intermediate keyring .ima_root_ca because this is how i use it. However, it is system-wide trusted keyring, which accepts keys that are either trusted by CAs in the .system_keyring or higher level CA is already in .ima_root_ca. For example CertC will be accepted in .ima_root_ca if CertB is already there.
The name (.ima_root_ca) is misleading and should be replaced with something that better describes it's functionality. As far as i see there is no reason this keyring not to hold the CA that verifies module's signature.
Petko
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