Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [GIT PULL] kdbus for 4.1-rc1 | From | Łukasz Stelmach <> | Date | Thu, 30 Apr 2015 14:40:35 +0200 |
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It was <2015-04-30 czw 14:23>, when Richard Weinberger wrote: > Am 30.04.2015 um 14:16 schrieb Łukasz Stelmach: >> It was <2015-04-30 czw 12:40>, when Richard Weinberger wrote: >>> Am 30.04.2015 um 12:19 schrieb Łukasz Stelmach: >>>> It was <2015-04-30 czw 11:12>, when Richard Weinberger wrote: >>>>> Am 30.04.2015 um 11:05 schrieb Łukasz Stelmach: >>>>>> Regardless, of initrd issues I feel there is a need of a local IPC >>>>>> that is more capable than UDS. [...] >>>> For example, a service can't aquire credentials of a client process that >>>> actually sent a request (it can, but it can't trust them). The service >>>> can't be protected by LSM on a bus that is driven by dbus-daemon. Yes, >>>> dbus-daemon, can check client's and srevice's labels and enforce a >>>> policy but it is going to be the daemon and not the LSM code in the >>>> kernel. >>> >>> That's why I said we can think of new kernel features if they are >>> needed. But they current sink or swim approach of kdbus folks is also >>> not the solution. As I said, if dbus-daemon utilizes the kernel >>> interface as much as possible we can think of new features. >> >> What kernel interfaces do you suggest to use to solve the issues >> I mentioned in the second paragraph: race conditions, LSM support (for >> example)? > > The question is whether it makes sense to collect this kind of meta data. > I really like Andy and Alan's idea improve AF_UNIX or revive AF_BUS.
Race conditions have nothing to do with metadata. Neither has LSM support.
AF_UNIX with multicast support wouldn't be AF_UNIX anymore.
AF_BUS? I haven't followed the discussion back then. Why do you think it is better than kdbus?
-- Łukasz Stelmach Samsung R&D Institute Poland Samsung Electronics [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |