Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 29 Apr 2015 15:09:37 -0700 | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation. |
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On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote: > From: Shawn C <citypw@gmail.com> > > Hi kernel maintainers, > > It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed). > This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity. > > Thanks for your review time!
Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?
These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the user range, we have a problem.
Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?
--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference, even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel
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