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Subject[tip:perf/x86] perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped
Commit-ID:  7911d3f7af14a614617e38245fedf98a724e46a9
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/7911d3f7af14a614617e38245fedf98a724e46a9
Author: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
AuthorDate: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 15:58:12 -0700
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 12:10:47 +0100

perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped

We currently allow any process to use rdpmc. This significantly
weakens the protection offered by PR_TSC_DISABLED, and it could be
helpful to users attempting to exploit timing attacks.

Since we can't enable access to individual counters, use a very
coarse heuristic to limit access to rdpmc: allow access only when
a perf_event is mmapped. This protects seccomp sandboxes.

There is plenty of room to further tighen these restrictions. For
example, this allows rdpmc for any x86_pmu event, but it's only
useful for self-monitoring tasks.

As a side effect, cap_user_rdpmc will now be false for AMD uncore
events. This isn't a real regression, since .event_idx is disabled
for these events anyway for the time being. Whenever that gets
re-added, the cap_user_rdpmc code can be adjusted or refactored
accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Cc: "hillf.zj" <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a2bdb3cf3a1d70c26980d7c6dddfbaa69f3182bf.1414190806.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 16 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h | 2 ++
4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 876e74e..09b9620 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ typedef struct {

struct mutex lock;
void __user *vdso;
+
+ atomic_t perf_rdpmc_allowed; /* nonzero if rdpmc is allowed */
} mm_context_t;

#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 52c1835..89c1fec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@ static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT */

+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ if (atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
+ else
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
+}
+#else
+static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+#endif
+
/*
* Used for LDT copy/destruction.
*/
@@ -52,6 +64,9 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
/* Stop flush ipis for the previous mm */
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(prev));

+ /* Load per-mm CR4 state */
+ load_mm_cr4(next);
+
/*
* Load the LDT, if the LDT is different.
*
@@ -87,6 +102,7 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
*/
load_cr3(next->pgd);
trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ load_mm_cr4(next);
load_LDT_nolock(&next->context);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
index 73e84a3..bec5cff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/nmi.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -1328,8 +1329,6 @@ x86_pmu_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
break;

case CPU_STARTING:
- if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
if (x86_pmu.cpu_starting)
x86_pmu.cpu_starting(cpu);
break;
@@ -1805,14 +1804,44 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
event->destroy(event);
}

+ if (ACCESS_ONCE(x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc))
+ event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED;
+
return err;
}

+static void refresh_pce(void *ignored)
+{
+ if (current->mm)
+ load_mm_cr4(current->mm);
+}
+
+static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
+ return;
+
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&current->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed) == 1)
+ on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ if (!current->mm)
+ return;
+
+ if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
+ return;
+
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&current->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
+ on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+}
+
static int x86_pmu_event_idx(struct perf_event *event)
{
int idx = event->hw.idx;

- if (!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
+ if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
return 0;

if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed && idx >= INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
@@ -1830,16 +1859,6 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
return snprintf(buf, 40, "%d\n", x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc);
}

-static void change_rdpmc(void *info)
-{
- bool enable = !!(unsigned long)info;
-
- if (enable)
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
- else
- cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
-}
-
static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
@@ -1854,11 +1873,7 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc_broken)
return -ENOTSUPP;

- if (!!val != !!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc) {
- x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
- on_each_cpu(change_rdpmc, (void *)val, 1);
- }
-
+ x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
return count;
}

@@ -1901,6 +1916,9 @@ static struct pmu pmu = {

.event_init = x86_pmu_event_init,

+ .event_mapped = x86_pmu_event_mapped,
+ .event_unmapped = x86_pmu_event_unmapped,
+
.add = x86_pmu_add,
.del = x86_pmu_del,
.start = x86_pmu_start,
@@ -1922,7 +1940,8 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event,

userpg->cap_user_time = 0;
userpg->cap_user_time_zero = 0;
- userpg->cap_user_rdpmc = x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc;
+ userpg->cap_user_rdpmc =
+ !!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED);
userpg->pmc_width = x86_pmu.cntval_bits;

if (!sched_clock_stable())
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
index 4e6cdb0..df525d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct event_constraint {
#define PERF_X86_EVENT_COMMITTED 0x8 /* event passed commit_txn */
#define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_LD_HSW 0x10 /* haswell style datala, load */
#define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_NA_HSW 0x20 /* haswell style datala, unknown */
+#define PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED 0x40 /* grant rdpmc permission */
+

struct amd_nb {
int nb_id; /* NorthBridge id */

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