Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Mon, 30 Nov 2015 11:47:52 +0100 | From | Daniel Borkmann <> | Subject | Re: heap out-of-bounds access in array_map_update_elem |
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On 11/30/2015 11:42 AM, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > Hello, > > > The following program causes heap-of-bounds access in array_map_update_elem: > > > // autogenerated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) > #include <syscall.h> > #include <string.h> > #include <stdint.h> > > #define SYS_bpf 321 > > int main() > { > long r0 = syscall(SYS_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x10000ul, 0x3ul, > 0x32ul, 0xfffffffffffffffful, 0x0ul); > *(uint32_t*)0x20000d9b = 0x2; > *(uint32_t*)0x20000d9f = 0x4; > *(uint32_t*)0x20000da3 = 0x7; > *(uint32_t*)0x20000da7 = 0x9; > long r5 = syscall(SYS_bpf, 0x0ul, 0x20000d9bul, 0x10ul, 0, 0, 0); > *(uint32_t*)0x20001fe0 = r5; > *(uint32_t*)0x20001fe4 = 0x0; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001fe8 = 0x20001000; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001ff0 = 0x20000f42; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001ff8 = 0x0; > long r11 = syscall(SYS_bpf, 0x2ul, 0x20001fe0ul, 0x20ul, 0, 0, 0); > *(uint32_t*)0x20001fe0 = r5; > *(uint32_t*)0x20001fe4 = 0x0; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001fe8 = 0x20001000; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001ff0 = 0x20000f42; > *(uint64_t*)0x20001ff8 = 0x0; > long r17 = syscall(SYS_bpf, 0x2ul, 0x20001fe0ul, 0x20ul, 0, 0, 0); > return 0; > } > > > ================================================================== > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff88003a6bd110 > Read of size 8 by task a.out/6260 > ============================================================================= > BUG kmalloc-8 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > INFO: Allocated in SyS_bpf+0xfd4/0x1a20 age=4 cpu=0 pid=6260 > [< none >] __slab_alloc+0x235/0x570 mm/slub.c:2399 > [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2467 > [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2509 > [< none >] __kmalloc+0x1f7/0x260 mm/slub.c:3414 > [< inline >] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:445 > [< inline >] map_update_elem kernel/bpf/syscall.c:288 > [< inline >] SYSC_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:744 > [< none >] SyS_bpf+0xfd4/0x1a20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:695 > [< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a > arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 > > INFO: Slab 0xffffea0000e9af00 objects=24 used=14 fp=0xffff88003a6bd3b0 > flags=0x1fffc0000004080 > INFO: Object 0xffff88003a6bd110 @offset=4368 fp=0xffff88003a6bc930 > CPU: 0 PID: 6260 Comm: a.out Tainted: G B 4.4.0-rc1+ #129 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 > 00000000ffffffff ffff880033347ce0 ffffffff82745526 ffff88003e804280 > ffff88003a6bd110 ffff88003a6bc000 ffff880033347d10 ffffffff816229c4 > ffff88003e804280 ffffea0000e9af00 ffff88003a6bd110 0000000000000000 > > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff8162a294>] __asan_loadN+0x124/0x1a0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:510 > [<ffffffff8162a81d>] memcpy+0x1d/0x40 mm/kasan/kasan.c:296 > [<ffffffff814fd66a>] array_map_update_elem+0xca/0x110 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:108 > [< inline >] map_update_elem kernel/bpf/syscall.c:300 > [< inline >] SYSC_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:744 > [<ffffffff814efa89>] SyS_bpf+0x1509/0x1a20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:695 > [<ffffffff85988836>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a > arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 > ================================================================== > > > On commit 90b55590c43258a157a2a143748455dcc50fbb53 (Nov 20). > > > The OOB accesses happens here: > > static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void > *value, u64 map_flags) > { > .... > memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size); >
Hehe, funny, I was just working on a fix already, just noticed this during review on the other patch. We need something like this, will submit it properly in some minutes:
From 5e5ac319463d27a744367eae183cda9c0759a0a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <5e5ac319463d27a744367eae183cda9c0759a0a1.1448880311.git.daniel@iogearbox.net> From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 11:29:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH net] bpf, array map: fix buffer overflow and memory leakage
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> --- kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index 3f4c99e..4c67ce3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, /* all elements already exist */ return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size); + memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size); return 0; }
-- 1.9.3
> Memory allocated for value is of size array->value_size, which can be > up to 7 bytes less than array->elem_size. Most likely it cannot lead > to GPF when called from syscall with current slab implementation. I > don't know whether this OOB can cause any issues when called from a > BPF program. > It also copies uninit garbage into the map. I don't see how that > garbage can be fetched later either by syscall or by a BPF program. > But still I think it is better to copy array->elem_size and leave the > trailer zero initialized just to be on the safer side. > > Thanks > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >
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