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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates
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On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 07:30:12PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 02:02:09PM -0500, Austin S Hemmelgarn wrote:
>
> > >_Static_ attacks, or change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks?
> > To properly protect against attacks on mounted filesystems, we'd
> > need some new concept of a userspace immutable file (that is, one
> > where nobody can write to it except the kernel, and only the kernel
> > can change it between regular access and this new state), and then
> > have the kernel set an image (or block device) to this state when a
> > filesystem is mounted from it (this introduces all kinds of other
> > issues too however, for example stuff that allows an online fsck on
> > the device will stop working, as will many un-deletion tools).
> >
> > The only other option would be to force the FS to cache all metadata
> > in memory, and validate between the cache and what's on disk on
> > every access, which is not realistic for any real world system.
>
> Doctor, it hurt when I do it...
>
> IOW, the other option is to refuse attempting this insanity. Fuse probably
> can be handled, but being able to mount (with kernel-space drivera) an
> arbitrary ext4 image is equivalent to being able to do anything and it's
> going to stay that way for the forseeable future.

What about the filesystems that desktop users commonly mount? (fat,
isofs, udf?)

--b.


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