Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 8 Oct 2015 08:21:55 +0200 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs |
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* Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> wrote:
> As far as sysctl we can look at two with similar purpose: > sysctl_perf_event_paranoid and modules_disabled. > First one is indeed multi level, but not because of the fear of bugs, > but because of real security implications.
It serves both purposes flexibly, and note that most people and distros will use the default value.
> [...] Like raw events on hyperthreaded cpu or uncore events can extract data > from other user processes. So it controls these extra privileges.
It also controls the generally increased risk caused by a larger attack surface, which some users may not want to carry and which they can thus shrink.
With a static keys approach there would be no runtime overhead worth speaking of, so I see no reason why unprivileged eBPF couldn't have a sysctl too - with the default value set to permissive.
Thanks,
Ingo
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