Messages in this thread | | | From | Stephan Mueller <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures | Date | Thu, 03 Jul 2014 16:10:07 +0200 |
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Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: >On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: >> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state >> that >> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature >> checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only >> module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into >> the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm >> module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make >> CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is >> entirely necessary for FIPS mode. >> >> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline >> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. >> >> CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> >> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> >> CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> >> CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com> >> CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> > >Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
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