Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Mon, 2 Jun 2014 16:08:30 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC |
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On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> Hi Andrew, >>>>> >>>>> Would you be willing to carry this series? Andy Lutomirski appears >>>>> happy with it now. (Thanks again for all the feedback Andy!) If so, it >>>>> has a relatively small merge conflict with the bpf changes living in >>>>> net-next. Would you prefer I rebase against net-next, let sfr handle >>>>> it, get carried in net-next, or some other option? >>>> >>>> Well, I'm still not entirely convinced that we want to have this much >>>> multiplexing in a prctl, and I'm still a bit unconvinced that the code >>> >>> I don't want to get caught without interface argument flexibility >>> again, so that's why the prctl interface is being set up that way. >> >> I was thinking that a syscall might be a lot prettier. It may pay to >> cc linux-api, too. >> >> I'll offer you a deal: if you try to come up with a nice, clean >> syscall, I'll try to write a fast(er) path for x86_64 to reduce >> overhead. I bet I can save 90-100ns per syscall. :) > > Now added to the Cc. > > Which path do you mean to improve? Neither the prctl nor a syscall for > this would need to be fast at all.
Non-seccomp-related syscalls when seccomp is enabled.
> > I don't want to go in circles on this. I've been there before on my > VFS link hardening series, and my module restriction series. I would > like consensus from more than just one person. :)
I can't offer you anyone else's review, unfortunately :-/
> > I'd like to hear from other folks on this (akpm?). My instinct is to > continue using prctl since that is already where mediation for seccomp > happens. I don't see why prctl vs a new syscall makes a difference > here, frankly.
Aesthetics? There's a tendency for people to get annoyed at big multiplexed APIs, and your patches will be doubly multiplexed.
TBH, I care more about the atomicity thing than about the actual form of the API.
--Andy
> > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security
-- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
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