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    SubjectRe: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
    Date
    On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:26 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
    > > On the other hand, disabling CAP_SYS_RAWIO *definitely* breaks expected
    > > functionality - firmware loading and the fibmap ioctl are probably the
    > > most obvious. And changing the use of CAP_SYS_RAWIO potentially breaks
    > > userspace expectations, so we're kind of stuck there.
    >
    > Actually I know how to describe the problem better.
    >
    > Whitelist v Blacklist.
    >
    > Going around adding extra cases for CAP_SYS_RAWIO is a fails insecure
    > model. Going around adding CAP_SYS_RAWIO || CAP_SYS_RAWIO_SEC is a 'fails
    > secure' case.

    We've already been through this. We can't add new capabilities. It
    breaks existing userspace.

    --
    Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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