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SubjectRe: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Josh Boyer <> wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Greg KH <> wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 01:04:34PM -0500, Josh Boyer wrote:
>>> On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Matthew Garrett
>>> <> wrote:
>>> > The conclusion we came to at Plumbers was that this patchset was basically
>>> > fine but that Linus hated the name "securelevel" more than I hate pickled
>>> > herring, so after thinking about this for a few months I've come up with
>>> > "Trusted Kernel". This flag indicates that the kernel is, via some
>>> > external mechanism, trusted and should behave that way. If firmware has
>>> > some way to verify the kernel, it can pass that information on. If userspace
>>> > has some way to verify the kernel, it can set the flag itself. However,
>>> > userspace should not attempt to use the flag as a means to verify that the
>>> > kernel was trusted - untrusted userspace could have set it on an untrusted
>>> > kernel, but by the same metric an untrusted kernel could just set it itself.
>>> FWIW, I've been running a kernel using this patchset in place of the
>>> patchset Fedora typically carries for this purpose for a bit. Things
>>> appear to be working as expected and the protections remain the same.
>>> It would be really nice to get this set of patches in so some of the
>>> other patches that depend on them can start being pushed as well.
>> What other patches depend on this series? Why aren't they also in this
>> series?
> The patches we have to import certificates from the UEFI db and dbx
> vars, and MokListRT and apply them to signed module verification.
> Looking at them closely, there are pieces that could be sent now as
> they are slightly orthogonal to what this patchset is doing, which is
> probably why they aren't in this patchset to begin with. I'll have to
> figure out which of those actually depend on anything in Matthew's
> series.

OK, I figured it out. I have a patch that adds an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
x86_efi_facility bit, and that is used in the later patches where
applicable. The patch that adds it depends on patch 12 in Matthew's

There are a few patches that are mostly stand-alone and I'll try and
get those sent out soon. They're a mix of things from David Howells
and myself, and should probably go through the security tree.


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