[lkml]   [2014]   [Feb]   [17]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [CRIU] [PATCH 1/3] prctl: reduce permissions to change boundaries of data, brk and stack
On 02/15/2014 12:09 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Pavel Emelyanov <> writes:
>> On 02/14/2014 11:16 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Cyrill Gorcunov <> writes:
>>>> On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 09:43:14PM +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote:
>>>>>> My brain hurts just looking at this patch and how you are justifying it.
>>>>>> For the resources you are mucking with below all you have to do is to
>>>>>> verify that you are below the appropriate rlimit at all times and no
>>>>>> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check is needed. You only need CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
>>>>>> to exceed your per process limits.
>>>>>> All you have to do is to fix the current code to properly enforce the
>>>>>> limits.
>>>>> I'm afraid what you are suggesting doesn't work.
>>>>> The first reason is that we can not change both boundaries in one call.
>>>>> But when we are restoring these attributes, we may need to move their
>>>>> too far.
>>>> When this code was introduced, there were no user-namespace implementation,
>>>> if I remember correctly, so CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was enough barrier point
>>>> to prevent modifying this values by anyone. Now user-ns brings a limit --
>>>> we need somehow to provide a way to modify these mm fields having no
>>>> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE set. "Verifying rlimit" not an option here because
>>>> we're modifying members one by one (looking back I think this was not
>>>> a good idea to modify the fields in this manner).
>>>> Maybe we could improve this api and provide argument as a pointer
>>>> to a structure, which would have all the fields we're going to
>>>> modify, which in turn would allow us to verify that all new values
>>>> are sane and fit rlimits, then we could (probably) deprecate old
>>>> api if noone except c/r camp is using it (I actually can't imagine
>>>> who else might need this api). Then CAP_SYS_RESOURCE requirement
>>>> could be ripped off. Hm? (sure touching api is always "no-no"
>>>> case, but maybe...)
>>> Hmm. Let me rewind this a little bit.
>>> I want to be very stupid and ask the following.
>>> Why can't you have the process of interest do:
>>> ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACHME);
>>> execve(executable, args, ...);
>>> /* Have the ptracer inject the recovery/fixup code */
>>> /* Fix up the mostly correct process to look like it has been
>>> * executing for a while.
>>> */
>> Let's imagine we do that.
>> This means, that the whole memory contents should be restored _after_
>> the execve() call, since the execve() flushes old mappings. In
>> that case we lose the ability to preserve any shared memory regions
>> between any two processes. This "shared" can be either regular
>> MAP_SHARED mappings or MAP_ANONYMOUS but still not COW-ed ones.
> If we have MAP_ANONYMOUS but not COW-ed mappings we have the correct
> executable, which implies we have everything else correct except for the
> brk and the stack addresses, because the process was started with fork.
> So while that sounds like an interesting case to handle it does not seem
> to invalidate the idea of using exec to set all of the other fields when
> we need to set them.

Well, yes, what you propose we call "inheritable resources". These are, e.g.
SIDs or shared FD-table/MM-s. That's OK to restore them at fork(), but I'd like
to draw your attention to two concerns I have with this approach.

1. Inheritable resources can be potentially restored more than one time. Consider
you have tasks tree look like this:

task-A -[exe]-> A
`- task-C1 -[exe]-> C
`- task-C2 -[exe]-> C

IOW -- task A has executable A and two kids C1 and C2 that share executable C.

In that case the restore sequence should look like this

* Task A calls execve() on C
* Task A forks C1
* Task A forks C2
* Task A calls execve() on A

This does work, I agree, but task A has to call execve() two times. And even more, if
we had e.g. D1 and D2 kids with different exe D. Now, why I think that's a problem?
Please, see concern #2 :)

2. What you propose means we have to effectively strace and execve-ing task. As
compared with plain prlctl this is up to ~600 times slower. I've made such an experiment.

* Idle node with plenty of free RAM
* Simple proggie doing execve() on self for 1000 times, compiled statically to avoid spoiling the times, run under strace
* Another proggie doing open() + prlctl() 1000 times.

The first task took ~12 sec to complete. The second -- ~0.02 seconds.

If we take an average container of 100 tasks, even with all different exe links, your
approach would give us ~1 sec more to restore, while existing one would be almost
no op. And this hits us even without the inheritance scenario I demonstrated above.

Please, keep in mind, that checkpoint-restore in not only live-migration, we have
use cases where restore cannot be pre-restored for better down-time. It _must_ be
as fast as possible.

That said, Eric, I do agree with your concern about security, I _am_ ready to rework
this stuff and kill the whole bunch of prctls we have. But please! Very please! Can
we come up with mm->foo-s and ->exe_link restoration API that is at most ... 5 times
slower than existing prlctl? It's really-really important for us!

Maybe we can make prlctl() do lite-execve()? It will open the executable, read the
required amount of headers and just put data red from there onto mm-struct? This
should be MUCH better, that full execve() with loading all binary data plus strace
and flushing old mm-s.

> Eric


 \ /
  Last update: 2014-02-17 09:41    [W:0.162 / U:0.120 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site