Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 31 Dec 2014 09:47:33 +0100 | From | Toralf Förster <> | Subject | Re: v3.19-rc2: crashes during boot (syslog-ng, rpcbind ...) |
| |
On 12/30/2014 07:46 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tuesday, December 30, 2014 09:11:32 AM Paul Moore wrote: >> On Monday, December 29, 2014 09:18:44 PM Toralf Förster wrote: >>> On 12/29/2014 08:41 PM, Paul Moore wrote: >>>> To help verify that I'm heading down the right path, could you share >>>> your audit configuration as well? If that's not possible, can you at >>>> least confirm that you using a few audit directory watches? >>> >>> Well, it is just a victim system for trinity - but I did not configured >>> auditd in a special manner - so it is just the plain default configuration >>> of Gentoo: >> >> Okay, thanks for the information; the file related syscall watches are >> likely what triggered the problem code. Until I've got the fix sorted out, >> removing the syscall watches or just disabling auditd from starting at boot >> should workaround the problem. > > I still want to go over the below patch a bit more to check a few things, but > it solves the problem for me and I believe it should solve the problem you are > seeing as well. Can you give it a try and let me know what happens? > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 287b3d3..d834770 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ > #include <linux/fs_struct.h> > #include <linux/compat.h> > #include <linux/ctype.h> > +#include <linux/string.h> > +#include <uapi/linux/limits.h> > > #include "audit.h" > > @@ -1862,7 +1864,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct > dentry *dentry, > > list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { > /* does the name pointer match? */ > - if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name) > + if (!n->name || strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) > continue; > > /* match the correct record type */ > @@ -1881,14 +1883,39 @@ out_alloc: > n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); > if (!n) > return; > - if (name) > - /* since name is not NULL we know there is already a matching > - * name record, see audit_getname(), so there must be a type > - * mismatch; reuse the string path since the original name > - * record will keep the string valid until we free it in > - * audit_free_names() */ > - n->name = name; > + /* unfortunately, while we may have a path name to record with the > + * inode, we can't always rely on the string lasting until the end of > + * the syscall so we need to create our own copy, it may fail due to > + * memory allocation issues, but we do our best */ > + if (name) { > + /* we can't use getname_kernel() due to size limits */ > + struct filename *new = __getname(); > > + if (unlikely(!new)) > + goto out; > + > + memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new)); > + if ((strlen(name->name) + 1) <= (PATH_MAX - sizeof(*new))) { > + char *new_name = (char *)(new) + sizeof(*new); > + new->name = new_name; > + new->separate = false; > + } else { > + /* this looks odd, but is due to final_putname() */ > + struct filename *new2; > + new2 = kzalloc(sizeof(*new2), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!new2)) { > + __putname(new); > + goto out; > + } > + new2->name = (char *)new; > + new = new2; > + new->separate = true; > + } > + strcpy((char *)new->name, name->name); > + new->aname = n; > + n->name = new; > + n->name_put = true; > + } > out: > if (parent) { > n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; >
n22kvm-clone linux patch -p1 --dry-run < /mnt/t44/devel/kvm.patch patching file kernel/auditsc.c patch: **** malformed patch at line 15: dentry *dentry,
-- Toralf pgp key: 7B1A 07F4 EC82 0F90 D4C2 8936 872A E508 0076 E94E
| |