lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2014]   [Nov]   [10]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
    /
    Date
    SubjectRe: crypto: zeroization of sensitive data in af_alg
    From
    On Sun, Nov 9, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:

    > while working on the AF_ALG interface, I saw no active zeroizations of memory
    > that may hold sensitive data that is maintained outside the kernel crypto API
    > cipher handles. ...

    > I think I found the location for the first one: hash_sock_destruct that should
    > be enhanced with a memset(0) of ctx->result.

    See also a thread titled "memset() in crypto code?" on the linux
    crypto list. The claim is that gcc can optimise memset() away so you
    need a different function to guarantee the intended results. There's a
    patch to the random driver that uses a new function
    memzero_explicit(), and one of the newer C standards has a different
    function name for the purpose.


    \
     
     \ /
      Last update: 2014-11-11 04:21    [W:4.199 / U:2.152 seconds]
    ©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site