Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Wed, 29 Oct 2014 15:28:25 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 00/12] Add kdbus implementation |
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On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:25 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:00 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman >> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> > * Attachment of trustable metadata to each message on demand, such as >> > the sending peer's timestamp, creds, auxgroups, comm, exe, cmdline, >> > cgroup path, capabilities, security label, audit information, etc, >> > each taken at the time the sender issued the ioctl to send the >> > message. Which of those are actually recorded and attached is >> > controlled by the receiving peer. >> >> I think that each piece of trustable metadata needs to be explicitly >> opted-in to by the sender at the time of capture. Otherwise you're >> asking for lots of information leaks and privilege escalations. This >> is especially important given that some of the items in the current >> list could be rather sensitive. > > You do have to opt-in for this information at time of capture, so I > don't understand the issue here. This is the same type of thing that > dbus does today, and I don't see the information leaks happening there, > do you? >
The docs suggest that the *receiver* opts in.
I don't think that current dbus has severe information leaks because the total scope for information transparently sent to dbus is rather small (struct ucred only, presumably).
--Andy
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