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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
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On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:54 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> So I pulled this, but one question:
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 8:47 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
>> +config RANDOMIZE_BASE
>> + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
>> + depends on RELOCATABLE
>> + depends on !HIBERNATION
>
> How fundamental is that "!HIBERNATION" issue? Right now that
> anti-dependency on hibernation support will mean that no distro kernel
> will actually use the kernel address space randomization. Which
> long-term is a problem.
>
> I'm not sure HIBERNATION is really getting all that much use, but I
> suspect distros would still want to support it.
>
> Is it just a temporary "I wasn't able to make it work, need to get
> some PM people involved", or is it something really fundamental?

Right, this is a "need to get PM people involved" situation. When
kASLR was being designed, hibernation learning about the kernel base
looked like a separable problem, and given the very long list of
requirements for making it work at all, I carved this out as "future
work".

As for perf, it's similar -- it's another entirely solvable problem,
but perf needs to be untaught some of its assumptions.

We've had a static kernel base forever, so I'm expecting some bumps in
the road here. I'm hopeful none of it will be too painful, though.

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security


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