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SubjectRe:
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On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett
> <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> wrote:
>> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
>> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
>> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
>> relax the restrictions.
>>
>> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
>> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
>> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
>> the existing restrictions useless.
>>
>> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
>> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
>> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
>> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
>> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
>> guarantee of kernel integrity.
>>
>> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp.
>
> Looks good to me. Consider the entire series:
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

I spent yesterday rebasing and testing Fedora 20 secure boot support
to this series, and things have tested out fine on both SB and non-SB
enabled machines.

For the series:

Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

josh


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