Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:05:53 -0400 | Subject | Re: | From | Josh Boyer <> |
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On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett > <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> wrote: >> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling >> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted >> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to >> relax the restrictions. >> >> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to >> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to >> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering >> the existing restrictions useless. >> >> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points >> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement >> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the >> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically >> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger >> guarantee of kernel integrity. >> >> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp. > > Looks good to me. Consider the entire series: > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
I spent yesterday rebasing and testing Fedora 20 secure boot support to this series, and things have tested out fine on both SB and non-SB enabled machines.
For the series:
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
josh
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